psycoloquy.00.11.066.ai-cognitive-science.6.furedy Sat Feb 5 2000
ISSN 1055-0143 (6 paragraphs, 8 references, 183 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 2000 John J. Furedy
IS INSTRUMENTALISM THE RIGHT METHOD FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE?
Commentary on Green on AI-Cognitive-Science
The Fruits of Paradigm-Shift Instrumentalism
John J. Furedy
Department of Psychology
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3
Canada
furedy@PSYCH.TORONTO.EDU
ABSTRACT: Green's assertion that "the computer model ... lends
itself to realism about mental states, whereas behaviorism
encourages mental instrumentalism" is consistent with most accounts
of the cognitive revolution in psychology, but I contend here that
it is wrong. My arguments are based on distinctions between realism
and instrumentalism, theories and models, and cognitive and
non-cognitive psychological functions, as well as on an account of
the S-S vs. S-R, Tolman vs. Hull learning theory arguments about
what is learned (psychology's then central issue), culminating in
the 1953 and 1952 papers, respectively, by Kendler and Ritchie. I
conclude that it is not the behaviorist, but the instrumentalist
tactic that is at the root of the problem, and that it is not only
AI but the instrumentalist approach that is not the right method
not only for cognitive science, but also for the science of
psychology.
1. Green's assertion that "the computer model ... lends itself to
realism about mental states, whereas behaviorism encourages mental
instrumentalism" (para. 1) is consistent with most current accounts of
the cognitive revolution in psychology, but I question this account. A
realist approach would require a computer _theory_ and not just _model_
of the mind (in an instrumentalist view, there is no clear distinction
between theories and models, since the true/false category has been
given up--see, e.g., Furedy, 1988), and no such theory would ever be
presented seriously, because it is patently false. It not only fails to
account for mentation that is at least partly influenced by affective
and connative factors, but it even ignores all cognition that is not
computational (i.e., computer-like). For example, although computers
can now play chess at a grand- master level, the mentation involved in
computer chess is nothing like that involved in human chess. The former
is purely computational, whereas the latter involves a combination of
computation, perception, and intuition, as well as quite a lot of non-
cognitive factors like affect (i.e., feelings about the chess position
which can exhibit varying degrees of beauty, feelings about oneself
[e.g., fear of the blunder, inadequacy], the opponent [hostility,
etc.]), and different degrees of connation (i.e., varying effort put
into the game depending on one's physical conditioning, and the
importance of the game). Moreover, to continue with this relatively
trivial example, to illustrate the task of any adequate psychological
explanation, there must be an account of all important cognitive _and_
non-cognitive phenomena if one wants to develop a science of
psychology, rather than merely more computer models of the mind.
2. Contrary to current accounts of the cognitive revolution which Green
appears to echo, the shift from (S-R) behaviorism to the (S- S)
cognitive approach in psychology was not, primarily, in terms of the
relevant evidence (which are realist grounds), but rather in terms of
theoretical fruitfulness (which are instrumentalist grounds).
Contemporary cognitivists like Segal and Lachman (1972) gave such an
instrumentalist account (although they did not use the term) of the
triumph of this modern cognitive approach, although the instrumentalist
aspect of the approach was systematically put forward two decades
before by Kendler (1952), who then was still defending the then
dominant Hull-Spence S-R position.
3. As has been detailed elsewhere (Furedy & Riley, 1987), the context
of Kendler's (1952) was learning theory, which occupied such a
prominent position in experimental psychology that it was often dubbed
as being equivalent to behavior theory, i.e., the theory of psychology.
And the most fundamental question of that period was that of "what is
learned?". The answer of the S-R theorists of the Hull-Spence school to
this question was that all learning was S- R learning, although the
explanatory S-R concepts included hypothetical entities like the
fractional anticipatory goal response (see, e.g., Spence, 1956 for a
relatively recent formulation) which were not only not directly
observable, but sometimes even dubbed as "incorporeal". The contrary
S-S view of Tolman and his students was that sign-significate,
propositional, S-S learning (e.g., "cognitive maps") also occurred, and
they strove to gather evidence for this cognitive view by running
experiments that showed phenomena like latent learning to occur. It is
important to note that these cognitive theorists were still
behaviorists, as they agreed with their S-R opponents that the way to
decide issues of this sort was through observation of behavior, often
in the "little white test-tube" (Osgood, 1953), i.e., the
laboratory-bred rat. And, of course, the fractional anticipatory goal
response and the cognitive map are equally "insubstantial", the
difference being that the latter, S-S construct is propositional or
cognitive, because it is not a category mistake to apply the notion of
truth and falsity to it. It is, in other words, a construct that can be
formulated propositionally, whereas the fractional anticipatory goal
response cannot (see Furedy & Riley, 1987, for elaboration of this
propositionally-based distinction between cognitive and non- cognitive
processes).
4. Kendler's (1952) paper, as suggested by the title, argued that by
the standard of "modern methodology" (which was really the approach of
instrumentalism), the S-R versus S-S debate was not over an empirical
issue, and that fruitfulness (which at that time clearly favored the
S-R camp) should decide the matter. Tolman's former student, Ritchie
(1953), provided the _reductio ad absurdum_ retort to Kendler's (1952)
position. The explicit focus of this paper is the defence of the S-S
cognitive view, but the mode of argument used clearly marks it as a
realist refutation of Kendler's (1952) instrumentalism. The implication
of Ritchie's (1953) humorous paper (the only funny paper in the history
of this _Journal_, and one likely reason why Ritchie lost the debate--
serious scientists do not make jokes) is that fundamental psychological
issues should be decided (though never with absolute certainty, since
all empirical assertions are open to error) on empirical grounds, more
specifically in terms of observed behavior in controlled experiments
designed to provide empirical arbitration between conflicting theories.
Tolman and other cognitivists like Ritchie were a _behaviorists_,
although their brand of behaviorism was a cognitive or S-S one, in
contrast the S-R behaviorism of the Hull-Spence school.
5. Until Kendler (1952) supplied the sword of instrumentalism (what he
called the principles of "modern methodology") to cut the Gordian knot
of "what is learned?" the accepted approach of both S-R and S-S
behaviorists was that of realism. That is, this and other issues in
psychology were considered to be empirical issues about which genuine
theories and not just models or analogies were to be constructed. And,
consistent with the (implicit) instrumentalism of his 1952 article,
Kendler later joined the cognitive "paradigm shift" which, as
characterized by Segal and Lachman (1972), was a shift based on
fruitfulness (of mainly the computer analogy for mind) rather than
evidence. On the other hand, the realist-cognitivist Ritchie
disappeared from experimental psychology and did not share in the
"fruits" of the new cognitivism. So Kendler rather than Ritchie won
the "hearts and minds" of most experimental psychologists not as
regards the psychological S-R versus S-S issue, but rather as regards
the philosophy-of-science issue between the instrumentalist and realist
approaches.
6. It is the adoption of the instrumentalist approach, the substitution
of models for theories that lead to putting the problems of psychology
into a "black box". This is regardless of whether the box is not talked
about at all (as Skinner recommends) or whether it is talked about only
in terms of models, analogies, and metaphors, but never in terms of
hypothetical processes that are assumed by the theory to really occur.
So it is not the "behaviorist" (Green, para. 10), but the
_instrumentalist_ tactic which is the root of the problem. And it is
not simply AI (which is just a particular version of cognitive
instrumentalism) but the instrumentalist approach that is not the right
method not just for cognitive science (and I am not at all sure whether
this is an area that has a clear referent), but for also for the
science of psychology.
REFERENCES
Furedy, J. J. (1988). On the relevance of philosophy for psychological
research: A preliminary analysis of some influences of Andersonian
realism. Australian Journal of Psychology, 24, 93- 100.
Furedy, J. J., & Riley, D. (1987). Human Pavlvoian autonomic
conditioning and the cognitive paradigm. In, G. Davey, G. (Ed).
Cognitive Processes and Pavlovian Conditioning in Humans, Wiley,
London.
Green, C.D. (2000) Is AI the Right Method for Cognitive Science?
PSYCOLOQUY 11(061)
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/2000.volume.11/
psyc.00.11.061.ai-cognitive-science.1.green
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.061
Kendler, H. H. (1952). What is learned?--A theoretical blind alley.
Psychology Review, 59, 269-77.
Osgood, C.E. (1953). Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology.
Oxford University Press, New York.
Ritchie, B. (1953). On the circumnavigation of cognition. Psychology
Review, 60, 206-211.
Segal, E. M., & Lachman, R. (1972). Complex behavior or higher mental
process: Is there a paradigm shift? American Psychologist, 27, 46-55.
Spence, K. W. (1956). Behavior Theory and Conditioning. Yale Univ.
Press, New Haven, CT.
